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ILLINOIS CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE
With the country facing an increasing number of political scandals,
both on the national and state levels, campaign disclosure laws have
never been more appropriate or necessary. Due to the excessive cost of
staging an effective campaign,' politicians are susceptible to possible corrupting influences. Admittedly our system of campaign financing is a
source of corruption. The influence of large contributors has destroyed
the credibility of our political leaders. Despite this, Illinois has maintained
its distinction as one of the few states which does not have a comprehensive campaign finance disclosure law. 2 In an effort to remedy this
situation, House Speaker Robert Blair introduced the Illinois Election
Campaign Act3 in the General Assembly in April, 1973. The Act would
have required public disclosure of all contributions and expenditures of
$100 or more in contests for major state offices. 4 While the proposal received overwhelming support from the House, it died in the Senate Exec1.

Campaign costs have risen sharply in recent years due to the enlargement

of the electorate, extensive use of radio and television, increased use of public opinion surveys, and the advent of the political management consultant. In the 1972
Illinois gubernatorial race, Governor Daniel Walker spent $528,633 and Richard
Ogilvie $702,293 on radio and television time alone. In the senatorial race, Senator
Charles Percy reported, to the FCC, spending in excess of $284,000. Broadcast
Spending, 31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1134-37 (1973).
2. One widely acclaimed full disclosure statute was passed in Florida in 1951.
It imposed a limit of $1000 on individual gifts and required the filing of reports
revealing the names of contributors. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161 (1973). The Florida press has given wide coverage to the contents of the reports filed by candidates;
therefore, Florida voters are well-informed about the true costs of running for office
in their state.
The Massachusetts election statute also contains a comprehensive disclosure
provision, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 16 (1973), yet the Massachusetts Crime
Commission has reported almost universal noncompliance with the statute in the
reporting of contributions and expenditures. See D. ADAMANY, CAMPAIGN FINANCE
IN AMERICA (1972).
See also Note, Report on Regulation, Limitation and Minimization of Campaign Finance, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 339 (1972).
3. House Bill 1620, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.B.
1620]. The stated purpose of the Act was to "promote fair practices in the conduct
of election campaigns for political offices in the State of Illinois." Id.
4. State elective office is defined by the Bill to include the offices of Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Comptroller, Treasurer,
State Senator, State Representative, and Supreme, Appellate and Circuit Judge.

H.B. 1620, art. I, § 1-8.
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utive Committee.5
Election campaign disclosure laws must balance the public's interest
in knowing the source of campaign contributions with the desire of politicians to protect the identity of their contributors. To be effective, the
law must clearly identify to whom it applies and the monetary limitations
involved. It must also be tightly drafted to eliminate loopholes and affect all candidates in a similar manner. Most importantly, it must provide

for adequate enforcement procedures and not seriously infringe the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the first amendment. 6
House Bill 1620 would have required any candidate seeking nomina-

tion for election, or election, to state office to report, in detail, contributions and expenditures made to his or her campaign. Contributions were
defined to include:
(1) a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything
of value . . ;
(2) a transfer of funds between political committees;
(3) the payment, by any person other than a candidate or political committee, of compensation for the personal services of another person
which are rendered to such candidate or political committee without
charge. . . .7
The Bill was comprehensive enough to include the purchase of tickets
for fund-raising events such as dinners, luncheons and rallies within its
definition of contribution." The Bill provided that expenditures included:
(1) a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of
money or anything of value, made for the purpose of influencing the
nomination for election, or election, of any person to State office;
and
(2) a transfer of funds between political committees. 9
5. The Bill was introduced in the House on April 26, 1973, amended and
favorably reported by the House Elections Committee on May 3, 1973. The House
passed the Bill on June 5th, by a 134-11 margin, but a "do-pass" motion failed on
June 14, 1973, in the Senate Executive Committee sounding the death knell for the
Bill. See 22 LEG. SYNOPSIS & DIG. Vol. II, 78th Ill. Gen. Assembly 832 (1973);
Chicago Tribune, June 15, 1973, § la, at 9, col. 1.
6. For a comprehensive discussion of the considerations and problems involved
in campaign financing using the 1970 elections as an analytical base, see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, GUIDE TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

471-98 (1971).
7. H.B. 1620, art. I, §
vided without compensation
time on behalf of a candidate
8. H.B. 1620, art. I, §
9. H.B. 1620, art. I, §

1-4. Contributions were not to include "services proby individuals volunteering a portion or all of their
or political committee." Id.
1-4.
1-5.
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The Bill clearly covered all expenditures made by or on behalf of a candidate.
The major portion of the Bill focused on the establishment of a political
committee, which was defined as
the candidate himself or any individual, committee, association, or organization which accepts contributions or makes expenditures on behalf of or
in opposition to a candidate or candidates for a State elective office during a calendar year in an aggregate amount exceeding $1000.10
The proposed committee would be required to register with the State
Board of Elections, and the committee's treasurer would be required to
file periodic reports with the Board disclosing the receipts and expenditures handled by the committee."
These reports were to include the total

amount of contributions received and expenditures made by the committee from July 1st of the preceding calendar year through June 30th of
the current year. In addition, reports would have to include the name,
address, occupation and amount of contribution of any person contributing $100 or more during the calendar year. 12 The State Board of Elections was to make these reports available for public inspection and copy3
ing and preserve them for a period of three years.'
The proposed legislation is similar to a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197114 which requires an itemized report of all
contributions and expenditures in excess of $100 of all candidates and
political committees disbursing money to a candidate. Critics of the Act
attack the lack of effective enforcement procedures.' 5 No independent
prosecutorial agency exists; all violations are referred to the Justice De10. H.B. 1620, art. I, § 1-7.
11.

H.B. 1620, art. IV, § 4-1.

12. H.B. 1620, art. IV, § 4-2. "Person" was defined by the Bill to include individuals, partnerships, corporations and other associations. H.B. 1620, art. I,
§ 1-5.
13. H.B. 1620, art. V, § 5-1.
14. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-454 (Supp. 1973). Title III of the Act covers the
disclosure of contributions and expenditures by candidates and campaign committees. See generally Comment, Undisclosed Earmarking: Violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 10 HARV. J. LEGIS. 175 (1973).

15. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 provides for complaints to be
filed with a supervisory officer who is responsible for referring the matter to the
Justice Department for institution of a criminal action. Enforcement is accom-

plished through the Clerk of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the
Senate and the General Accounting Office. Berry and Goldman, Congress and
Public Policy: A Study of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 10 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 331, 357 (1973). See also Comment, The Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971: Reform of the Political Process?, 60 Gao. L.J. 1309 (1972).
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partment for prosecution. 16 In contrast to the federal legislation, House
Bill 1620 provided more effective enforcement measures by vesting subpoena power in the State Board of Elections. The Board was to have
the power to hold investigations, inquiries and hearings concerning the
Act. 17 Complaints would be made directly to the Board which would
investigate them and render a final judgment within twenty-one days of
8
the filing date.'
The Board would also have had the power to petition any circuit court
with jurisdiction over the person for an injunction to restrain or prohibit
19
violations of the Act.
One of the main issues surrounding the proposed legislation is the effectiveness of the $100 or $1000 minimum. The $100 minimum for disclosure of contributions seems practical although higher figures have also
been considered. 20 The main objective of any minimum is to protect the
small contributor from notoriety or exposure. Any disclosure legislation
must be directed at the large contributor who hopes to influence policy
decisions or receive other favors in return for his support. The small contributor may only be seeking a tax deduction or may feel a certain allegiance to a particular candidate. Since the purpose of disclosure is to
minimize the possibility of corruption, the $100 minimum is reasonable.
While large contributors could channel their contributions through several individuals, thus avoiding disclosure, a great number of individuals
would have to be utilized to contribute a large sum of money to one
candidate.
The $1000 minimum required of political committees has been validly
criticized because, conceivably, a large number of committees could be
established, each handling less than $1000, thereby avoiding the requirement that records be kept and reports be filed. The Bill could have
16. On July 30, 1973 the United States Senate passed a bill which would establish a Federal Election Campaign Commission to enforce the election laws and
amend various other portions of the Federal Election Campaign Act. S.372, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. S15,088 (daily ed. July 30, 1973). The Bill was

referred to the Subcommittee on Elections of the House Administration Committee.
As this article went to print, hearings were being held on the Bill.

17.

H.B. 1620, art. V, § 5-3.

18.

H.B. 1620, art. V, § 5-5.

19. H.B. 1620, art. V, § 5-8. Willful violations of the provisions of the Act
would have constituted a Class A misdemeanor. H.B. 1620, art. VII, § 7-1. A
Class A misdemeanor is punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed one
year. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-3 (Supp. 1972).
20. One possible explanation for the $100 minimum is for the protection of the
anonymity of persons attending fund-raising dinners which often cost $100 per
person.
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been more restrictive, either by setting the minimum at $500 or even by
eliminating the minimum completely. A better proposal might have been
to allow only one or two political committees for each candidate. The
Bill was designed to facilitate public knowledge of campaign financing,
and this intent should not be thwarted by manipulation of funds between
many political committees.
Searching for reasons behind the defeat of House Bill 1620 in the Senate Executive Committee is to speculate at best. Senate President William Harris opposed the Bill claiming he had received no indication of
support from his constituents. Senate minority leader, Cecil Partee, suggested that the legislature wait until the Senate Watergate Committee
made its recommendations in regard to campaign disclosure.2 1 Other explanations for opposition might include a fear of antagonizing fellow politicians, a desire to cover up questionable campaign contributions, or a belief that such legislation really was not necessary.2 2 The defeat of House
Bill 1620 was actually political. While the public has the right to know
about individuals attempting to influence the electoral process, this right
must be balanced by the "chilling effect" such publicity might have on
contributors to unpopular causes. 23 Favors and patronage are part of the
politics involved in getting elected to public office in the State of Illinois.
A prime example of the misuse of political influence is the large number
of scandals involving the awarding of government contracts to supporters
of particular candidates, and kickbacks to those elected officials after the
24
contract is awarded.
The General Assembly has a responsibility to rebuild public confidence in politicians and state government by requiring campaign finance
disclosure, but it must also consider the protection of freedom of expression as guaranteed by the first amendment. It may be argued that an
individual has the right to support the candidate of his or her choice without reprisal or notoriety; whether freedom of expression encompasses
anonymity is a question of interpretation.2 5
21.
22.

Chicago Tribune, June 15, 1973, § la, at 9, col. 1.
Chicago Tribune, June 16, 1973, § 1, at 10, col. 1.

23. See generally Sterling, Control of Campaign Spending: The Reformers' Paradox, 59 A.B.A.J. 1148 (1973).
24. See generally Note, Campaign Finance Reform: Pollution Control for the

Smoke-Filled Rooms?, 23

CASE

W. RES. L. REV. 631 (1972).

The author contends

that a contributor is motivated by a desire to influence public policy, to elect

candidates who will be sympathetic to his viewpoint or to obtain a government
appointment. Id. at 636.
25.

Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U. L.

Rlv. 900, 924-32 (1971).

The author cites a series of cases dealing with the pro-
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Another important consideration in the passage of any bill is whether
the public interest will indeed be served. Full disclosure is primarily
aimed at deterring those with corrupt interests from contributing to a candidate and thereby exerting undue influences on that candidate which are not
in the best interest of the public. The Bill would, however, also sweep legitimate specific interest groups which are acting in the best interest of the
public into the same broad category with corrupt parties. While the
public might be willing to support secrecy in the case of contributions by
legitimate specific interest groups, in light of recent political history their
interest would still be best protected by full disclosure by all candidates of
all political contributions.
In response to a growing demand for accountability, several campaign
disclosure bills were introduced in the fall session of the General Assembly. 26 While the climate should be right for the passage of such bills in
light of Watergate, the allegations surrounding the resignation of VicePresident Spiro Agnew, and the low esteem in which politicians are now
held, the disclosure bills may be overshadowed by the regional mass
transportation and tax relief proposals also under consideration. 2 7 Perhaps legislators should fear the non-passage of disclosure legislation more
than they seem to fear its passage. Greater public pressure may be necessary, since it appears that politics rather than an actual concern for the
public welfare will determine the action taken by the legislature.
House Bill 1620 and others like it are responsible attempts toward better government. Although the courts have liberally construed the first
tection of membership lists and organizational affiliations to develop a first amendment right to anonymity of financial backers. He also suggests that by making the
media more available to all candidates, the importance of financial contributions
could be minimized and undue influence eliminated at least in part. Certainly his
contention that contributors to minority parties would be discouraged by the possibility of notoriety is valid. Thus full disclosure might well work against third party
candidates. See also Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech,
Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961).
26. Governor Walker proposed a package of bills to conform to his executive
order regarding disclosure. House Speaker Robert Blair introduced bills similar
to H.B. 1620. [H.B. 1 and H.B. 2, 78th I11. Gen. Assembly, 1st Special Sess.
(1973)]. Rep. Henry Hyde introduced a bill which would establish a rotating
panel of law school deans to review disclosure material deemed too personal for
publication. Chicago Sun Times, Nov. 4, 1973, § la, at 5, col. 1.
27. The Senate has traditionally put the damper on disclosure legislation, but on
November 16, 1973 the Senate passed both strong and weak disclosure bills. The
stronger of the bills was sponsored by Sen. John Roe and passed by a margin of 35-4.
Senate President Harris' weaker bill also passed, and both were sent to the House.
The House meanwhile rejected Governor Walker's package of bills as too broad
and sweeping; the vote was 75-34, with 89 votes needed for passage. Chicago Sun
Times, Nov. 16, 1973, at 28, col. 1.
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amendment freedom of expression in recent years, the balance must now
swing in favor of the full disclosure of the individuals behind the scenes
in Illinois politics. This will contribute to the restoration of public confidence in our form of government. Legislation similar to House Bill 1620
must be adopted in Illinois to better protect the interests of the public by
taking some of the politics out of politics.
Clem Hyland

